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Abstract
In German criminal trials, the common law instrument of the guilty plea is unknown. Conse-
quently, one cannot speak of plea bargaining in the strict sense. Nevertheless, informal negotia-
tions, which center on the exchange of a confession for a sentence concession, play an increasing
role in the German criminal process. It is claimed that in today’s Germany “the criminal procedure
cannot be imagined without the phenomenon of informal agreements.” After years of academic de-
bate and developing case law on informal agreements, the German Federal Parliament (Deutscher
Bundestag) has now passed new legislation that regulates agreements and makes them part of the
procedure. As a civil-law country, Germany’s criminal justice system is based on the notion that
the prime task of a criminal trial is to find the material truth.5 Rather than deciding which of the
contesting parties can present the better case, it is the court itself that has to unveil the facts of the
case. Section 244(2) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure reads: “In order to establish the
truth, the court shall, proprio motu, extend the taking of evidence to all facts and means of proof
relevant to the decision.” Finding the truth is an objective goal and not subject to the interests of
the defense or prosecution. Hence, an admission of guilt is not sufficient to convict the defendant.
A confession is rather just one among many forms of evidence and has no procedural function as
such. In particular, it is not sufficient to end or even avoid a trial. Nevertheless, one can find some
kind of negotiation at all stages of the criminal process,which is comparable to Anglo-American
plea bargaining. This Article outlines the development and current practice of informal proce-
dures in Germany and discusses the new procedure introduced in 2009. Part I shows how informal
agreements in Germany—comparable to plea bargaining in common-law systems—have started
to be used on a wider scale. Part II explains the main reasons for the use of informal settlements
in Germany. Part III discusses the procedural framework, looking at the context in which negotia-
tions occur and the possible content of such agreements, and analyzes the main problems of such
agreements. Part IV demonstrates how the German Supreme Court’s failure to restrict the informal
practice finally led to federal legislation—discussed in Part V—to regulate the practice. Part VI
discusses the problem that the development of an informal system, which neither the higher courts
nor the legislature can prevent or control, leads to the question of the relationship between law in
practice and theoretical due process principles. The final part concludes that informal settlements
in Germany, as well as plea bargaining in common-law countries, are a sign of a growing chasm
between theory and practice, which the new German law fails to bridge.
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FORMALIZATION OF PLEA BARGAINING IN 
GERMANY: WILL THE NEW LEGISLATION BE 
ABLE TO SQUARE THE CIRCLE? 
Regina E. Rauxloh * 
INTRODUCTION 
In German criminal trials, the common law instrument of 
the guilty plea is unknown. Consequently, one cannot speak of 
plea bargaining in the strict sense. Nevertheless, informal 
negotiations, which center on the exchange of a confession for a 
sentence concession, play an increasing role in the German 
criminal process.1 It is claimed that in today’s Germany “the 
criminal procedure cannot be imagined without the 
phenomenon of informal agreements.”2 After years of academic 
debate and developing case law on informal agreements, the 
German Federal Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) has now passed 
new legislation that regulates agreements and makes them part 
of the procedure.3 
As a civil-law country, Germany’s criminal justice system4 is 
based on the notion that the prime task of a criminal trial is to 
find the material truth.5 Rather than deciding which of the 
 
*  School of Law, University of Surrey. The author would like to thank Adrienne 
Wilson for her valuable comments on an earlier draft. All translations are the author’s. 
1. See THOMAS RÖNNAU, DIE ABSPRACHE IM STRAFPROZEß—EINE 
RRECHTSSYSTEMATISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG DER ZULÄSSIGKEIT VON ABSPRACHEN NACH DEM 
GELTENDEN STRAFPROZESSRECHT [THE INFORMAL AGREEMENT IN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE—A LEGAL-SYSTEMATIC EXAMINATION OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE 
AGREEMENTS IN CURRENT CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW] 249 (1990). 
2. Lutz Meyer-Großner, Gesetzliche Regelung der „Absprachen im Strafverfahren?“ [Legal 
Regulation of “Agreements in Criminal Proceedings?”],2004 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK 
[ZRP] 187, 187. 
3. See Gesetz zur Regelung der Verständigung im Strafverfahren [Act for the 
Regulation of Agreements in Criminal Proceedings], July 29, 2009, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I, [BGBL. I] at 2353. 
4. For an introduction to the German criminal procedure and its main legal 
principles, see NIGEL FOSTER, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS 212–28 (2d ed. 1996). 
5. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 26, 
1981, 57 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVERFGE] 250 (275), 
1981. 
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contesting parties can present the better case, it is the court itself 
that has to unveil the facts of the case. Section 244(2) of the 
German Code of Criminal Procedure reads: “In order to 
establish the truth, the court shall, proprio motu, extend the taking 
of evidence to all facts and means of proof relevant to the 
decision.”6 Finding the truth is an objective goal and not subject 
to the interests of the defense or prosecution. Hence, an 
admission of guilt is not sufficient to convict the defendant. A 
confession is rather just one among many forms of evidence and 
has no procedural function as such. In particular, it is not 
sufficient to end or even avoid a trial. Nevertheless, one can find 
some kind of negotiation at all stages of the criminal process, 
which is comparable to Anglo-American plea bargaining. 
This Article outlines the development and current practice 
of informal procedures in Germany and discusses the new 
procedure introduced in 2009. Part I shows how informal 
agreements in Germany—comparable to plea bargaining in 
common-law systems—have started to be used on a wider scale. 
Part II explains the main reasons for the use of informal 
settlements in Germany. Part III discusses the procedural 
framework, looking at the context in which negotiations occur 
and the possible content of such agreements, and analyzes the 
main problems of such agreements. Part IV demonstrates how 
the German Supreme Court’s failure to restrict the informal 
practice finally led to federal legislation—discussed in Part V—to 
regulate the practice. Part VI discusses the problem that the 
development of an informal system, which neither the higher 
courts nor the legislature can prevent or control, leads to the 
question of the relationship between law in practice and 
theoretical due process principles. The final part concludes that 
informal settlements in Germany, as well as plea bargaining in 
common-law countries, are a sign of a growing chasm between 
theory and practice, which the new German law fails to bridge. 
 
 
6. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], Apr. 7, 1987, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL. I] 1074, as amended, § 244(2). 
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I. THE BEGINNINGS OF INFORMAL AGREEMENTS IN 
GERMANY 
As in England and Wales, so in Germany, informal 
negotiations initially spread without being noticed. At the time 
when the American scholar John Langbein claimed Germany to 
be the “land without plea bargaining,”7 informal settlements 
were already being used regularly. Although it is very likely that 
in some form there have always been informal agreements,8 it is 
assumed that regular engagement in such negotiations was 
established in large-scale proceedings, such as financial crime,9 
tax evasion, environmental crime, and drug related crime10 
around the mid-1970s.11 One explanation for the rapid spread of 
informal settlements in these areas is that both courts and 
prosecution offices became increasingly overworked.12 During 
the last four decades, these areas have experienced considerable 
growth in the number of criminal cases. Financial crime has been 
prosecuted more intensively, and the number of drug offenses 
has grown immensely. However, as Rieß has shown, the number 
of legal staff has increased accordingly; therefore the rising 
number of cases alone does not sufficiently explain the 
development of informal agreements.13 Rather than the growing 
number of cases, it was the multiplying duration of the individual 
 
7. John H. Langbein, Land without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. 
L. REV. 204, 204 (1979). 
8. See Hans-Peter Marsch, Grundregeln bei Absprachen im Strafverfahren [Ground Rules 
for Agreements in Criminal Proceedings], 2007 ZRP 220, 220. 
9. Wirtschaftskriminalität consists of more crimes than just white-collar crime or 
commercial fraud; it also includes, for example, pollution. See LEONARD H. LEIGH & 
LUCIA ZEDNER, THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE PRE-TRIAL PHASE IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 
40 (1992). 
10. See Herbert Landau & Ralf Eschelbach, Absprachen zur Strafrechtlichen 
Hauptverhandlung [Agreements about Criminal Trials], 1999 NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 321, 321. 
11. See Symposium, Deutscher Juristentag: Die Beschlüsse [German Jurists Convention: 
The Resolutions], 1990 NJW 2991, 2992. 
12. See Raimund Hassemer & Gabriele Hippler, Informelle Absprachen in der Praxis 
des Deutschen Strafverfahrens [Informal Agreements in the Application of the German Criminal 
Procedure], 1986 STRAFVERTEIDIGER [STV] 360; Georg Küpper & Karl-Christian Bode, 
Absprachen im Strafverfahren—Bilanz einer Zehnjährigen Diskussion [Agreements in Criminal 
Proceedings—Record of a Ten-Year Discussion],1999 JURA 351, 354. 
13. Peter Rieß, Zur Entwicklung der Geschäftsbelastung in der Ordentlichen 
Gerichtsbarkeit [About the Development of the Workload of Ordinary Courts], 1982 DEUTSCHE 
RICHTERZEITUNG [DRIZ] 201, 201, 464. 
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proceedings that led practitioners to look for new means of 
coping with the caseload. 
The reasons for significantly lengthier trials lie in important 
changes in substantive criminal law in these areas. Since the end 
of the 1970s, the law on environmental crimes, drug-related 
crimes, and financial crimes such as tax or accounting fraud, 
have all been developed, amended, and most of all, expanded.14 
Arguably, the most important development is the change in actus 
reus and causation. In many new offenses, especially in 
environmental and financial crime, rather than one single 
identifiable action causing harm, the causation of danger itself 
has become the actus reus of the offense. The traditional concepts 
of conduct or result crimes have been replaced by “causation of 
danger crimes.” This makes it extremely difficult to prove the 
offense.15 At what point does a legitimate risk become an illegal 
danger? What is the scope of causation for that risk? To what 
extent did the defendant need to appreciate the risk? In order to 
eliminate the problems of evidence, criminal liability has moved 
forward on the scale of actions, so that the actus reus is assumed 
much earlier in the chain of events.16 
The distinction between legal and criminal behavior then 
becomes increasingly dependent on the defendant’s state of 
mind. For example, an action is deemed dangerous if the 
defendant perceived or could have perceived the risk. Without a 
confession, proving mens rea requires much indirect evidence. 
Investigation in these kinds of crimes calls for the screening of 
hundreds of documents and the testimony of dozens of witnesses 
(who sometimes have to be brought from abroad as, for example, 
when dealing with multinational trade). Consequently, the 
length of investigation, as well as of trials where the evidence 
needs to be presented and evaluated, has multiplied. The 
complex German criminal procedure, with its manifold 
procedural safeguards, is not equipped to deal with these new 
 
14. See Joachim Herrmann, Absprachen im Deutschen Strafverfahren [Agreements in 
German Criminal Proceedings], 31–32 ARCHIVUM IURIDICUM CRACOVIENSE 55, 56 (2000) 
(Pol.). 
15. See RÖNNAU, supra note 1, at 45. 
16. See KAI-D. BUSSMANN, DIE ENTDECKUNG DER INFORMALITÄT: ÜBER 
AUSHANDLUNGEN IN STRAFVERFAHREN UND IHRE JURISTISCHE KONSTRUKTION [THE 
DISCOVERY OF INFORMALITY: NEGOTIATIONS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AND THEIR LEGAL 
CONSTRUCTION ] 23 (1991). 
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requirements of substantive law. Even if the increase in judicial 
personnel initially offset the increasing number of cases,17 their 
swelling length and intensity has inevitably led to an enormous 
overload for the prosecution offices and the courts. Thus, large-
scale financial crimes are considered the pacesetter, as well as the 
principal domain,18 for informal settlements.19 
In 1982, a criminal defense lawyer under the pseudonym 
Detlef Deal published an article in Germany describing in detail 
the common practice of informal negotiations in large-scale 
criminal cases.20 He made it very clear that this practice was both 
widespread and hidden: “[N]early everybody knows it; nearly 
everybody does it, only nobody speaks it out loud.”21 In his view, 
the formal trial has degenerated to “a theatre” where the 
participants pretend to contribute to the finding of a sentence, 
which in reality has already been agreed on by all the parties. 
Despite strong criticism from all sides, legal professionals have 
not been deterred from engaging in informal settlements. Most 
practicing lawyers today agree that courts responsible for trying 
financial crimes would not be able to cope with the flood of 
large-scale cases if it were not for informal agreements.22 For 
example, in the state of Lower Saxony, over eighty percent of 
judgments in the area of organized crime are based on informal 
agreements.23 Interestingly, informal proceedings have also 
spread to less serious crimes,24 but they can even be found today 
 
17. See Hassemer & Hippler, supra note 12. 
18. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 19 (whose research has shown that in financial 
criminal cases the inquisitorial process is a rare exception). 
19. Another area is drug-related crime. The growing consumption of drugs since 
the end of the 1960s, the increased prosecution since the 1970s, and the increased 
criminalization, especially by the 1982 Narcotics Law (Betäubungsmittelgesetz), resulted in 
the number of cases and the length of the procedures growing immensely. Id. at 30. 
20. Detlef Deal, Aus der Praxis: Der Strafprozessuale Vergleich [In Practice: Settlements in 
Criminal Proceedings], 1982 STV 545 (dealing with drug offenses in line with the author’s 
field of work). 
21. Id. at 545. 
22. See Gunter Widmaier, Der Strafprozessuale Vergleich [Settlements in Criminal 
Proceedings], 1986 STV 357. 
23. Elisabeth Heister-Neumann, Absprachen im Strafprozess—der Vorschlag 
Niedersachsens zu einer Gesetzlichen Regelung [Agreements in Criminal Proceedings—Lower 
Saxony’s Proposal for Statutory Regulation], 2006 ZRP 137, 137. 
24. See Werner Schmidt-Hieber, Verständigungen im Strafverfahren [Agreements in the 
Criminal Trial], in ABSPRACHEN IM STRAFPROZEß—EIN HANDEL MIT DER GERECHTIGKEIT? 
[AGREEMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS—A BARGAIN WITH JUSTICE?] 52 (1987).  
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in serious violent crimes such as rape, aggravated robbery, and 
murder,25 although this is still exceptional.26 
II. MAIN REASONS FOR INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS 
The numerous reasons for the development and spread of 
informal negotiations into all areas of criminal law in Germany 
can only be summarized here. As in the Anglo-American 
discourse, German commentators usually mention the increasing 
overwork of courts and prosecution offices as the main reason for 
the spread of informal negotiations. Legal experts have no doubt 
that criminal procedure would break down without informal 
handling of cases.27 Thus it is claimed that informal negotiations 
help to sustain and stabilize the current criminal justice system.28 
Another major reason is the nature of modern legislation. The 
growing complexity of some criminal law areas means that courts 
are not just overworked, but actually out of their depth.29 
Further, the change from conduct or result crimes to “causation 
of danger crimes” means that the outcome of cases is much less 
predictable.30 It is this unpredictability that makes pre-trial 
agreements compelling for both defense and prosecution. For all 
courtroom actors, informal agreements mean easier and faster 
completion of the case. 
An additional reason for the rise of informal procedures is 
the shift in theories of punishment. The traditional idea that the 
primary function of punishment is retribution has now been 
complemented by the idea of general and specific deterrence.31 
 
25. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH][Federal Court of Justice] Aug. 28, 1997, 43 
ENTSCHEDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN STRAFSACHEN [BGHST] 195 (197), 
1997; BGH May 13, 1997, 11 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT [NSTZ] 561, 1997; 
BGH Oct. 19, 1993, 4 NSTZ 196, 1994. 
26. See Joachim Herrmann, Bargaining Justice—A Bargain for German Criminal 
Justice?, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 755, 756 (1992). 
27. See RÖNNAU, supra note 1, at 20. 
28. See Christian Lüdemann & Kai-D. Bussmann, Diversionschancen der Mächitgen? 
Eine Empirische Studie über Absprachen im Strafprozeß [Opportunities for Diversion for the 
Powerful? An Empirical Study of Agreements in the Criminal Process], 1989 
KRIMINOLOGISCHES JOURNAL [KRIMJ] 54, 69. 
29. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 29. 
30. See id. at 25. 
31. See Bernd Schünemann, Die Verständigung im Strafprozeß—Wunderwaffe oder 
Bankrotterklärung der Verteidigung? [Agreement in the Criminal Process—A Silver Bullet or 
Bankruptcy of the Defense?], 1989 NJW 1895, 1898. 
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The purpose of deterrence legitimizes time- and cost-saving 
procedures as goals of the criminal justice system, as opposed to 
the absolute theory of retribution, which is guided by the 
considerations of justice only.32 Herrmann points out that the 
function of the criminal process is no longer only to enforce the 
Penal Code but also to help to find solutions for social 
problems.33 According to him, more justice is achieved when all 
participants agree on the outcome, and rehabilitation is more 
likely to succeed when the defendant accepts the sentence.34 But 
agreeing to the mildest sanction possible does not necessarily 
mean accepting the judgment; rather it might merely mean 
choosing the lesser evil. 
Related to the change of sentencing purposes is the 
argument that the development of informal proceedings mirrors 
the development of a new relationship between state and 
citizen.35 The hierarchic interrelation in criminal law between 
the powerful state and its subordinate citizens is being replaced 
by a co-relation between more equal partners. This different 
relationship has long been recognized in administrative law 
where the state is in discussion with citizens to find a solution to 
the problem rather than exposing them to sanctions as in 
criminal law. In criminal law the decisive change again started in 
white collar and environmental crime where the newly extended 
legislation disregards the principle of ultima ratio.36 Areas 
previously dealt with by administrative law, which is open to 
negotiations between state and citizen,37 are now subjected to the 
inflexible criminal procedural law with its principle of 
compulsory prosecution.38 
With the increasing complexity of life and society, legislation 
expands the scope of the Penal Code to embrace more and more 
behaviors, such as forbidden waste disposal, that do not 
 
32. See RÖNNAU, supra note 1, at 61. 
33. Herrmann, supra note 26, at 775. 
34. Id. at 775–76. 
35. See id. at 775. 
36. See RÖNNAU, supra note 1, at 45. 
37. See Werner Schmidt-Hieber, Absprachen im Strafprozeß—Privileg des 
Wohlstandskriminellen? [Agreements in the Criminal Process—Privilege for the White Collar 
Criminal], 1990 NJW 1884, 1884. 
38. BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 25. Compulsory prosecution is a principle to 
protect from arbitrary choice of investigation and means that all crimes should be 
prosecuted. 
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ordinarily belong to the classical notion of crime.39 Whereas 
criminal law traditionally used to deal with deviant behavior 
committed by individuals outside or at least at the margins of 
society, criminal law now encompasses crimes committed by 
individuals in all sectors of society.40 In relation to this, Bussmann 
states that the courts tend to be lenient in large-scale proceedings 
not only because they are overtaxed with the complexity of the 
complicated legal provisions, but also because of class-
distinguishing tendencies;41 defendants of fiscal offenses, tax 
evasion, or environmental crime are often some of the most 
respected members of society from similar backgrounds as 
prosecutors and judges. Both of these aspects had an effect on 
the criminal process. Whereas criminal procedure traditionally 
reflected the subordination of the citizen to the state, a new form 
of interaction emerged in which the parties try to solve conflicts 
by cooperating and consenting.42 As a result, the defendant’s 
autonomy in criminal procedures has increased.43 Informal 
agreements reflect this development by replacing formal 
accusation and judgment with informal discussion and 
negotiations. 
III. PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK 
It is important to examine how a practice similar to plea 
bargaining could be introduced into the German criminal 
procedure, which does not recognize the guilty plea. Although 
some negotiations are initiated in the context of the main 
hearing, many informal agreements are linked to those 
procedures that provide the prosecution with some discretion 
because they are exceptions to the principle of compulsory 
prosecution according to which all crimes must be prosecuted. 
 
39. See Küpper & Bode, supra note 12, at 355. 
40. See GÖTZ GERLACH, ABSPRACHEN IM STRAFVERFAHREN: EIN BEITRAG ZU DEN 
RECHTSFOLGEN FEHLGESCHLAGENER ABSPRACHEN IM STRAFVERFAHREN [AGREEMENTS IN 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF FAILED 
AGREEMENTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS] 23 (1992). 
41. BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 29. 
42. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 78. 
43. See Schünemann, supra note 31, at 1898. 
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One of the core procedures used to open the way for 
informal negotiations is the penal order (Strafbefehl).44 Section 
407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives the prosecutor, in a 
case of a misdemeanor, the power to request an order imposing 
punishment from the judge if there is sufficient suspicion.45 If the 
accused does not appeal, the penal order replaces any further 
proceeding and the offender is immediately punished with a fine 
or a sentence on probation. Thus it avoids a full trial and comes 
very close to the guilty plea in common law systems. Hence it is 
not surprising that the penal order is a welcome starting point 
for informal negotiations. The defense counsel and prosecutor 
might agree that the prosecution will not bring further charges 
and request only a penal order if the accused is willing to accept 
the punishment suggested by the order.46 Typically, the defense 
lawyer and the prosecutor negotiate the amount of the sanction, 
with the judge usually agreeing to the order suggested by the 
prosecution.47 Today, some thirty-five percent of all cases are 
handled through a penal order, and it is realistic to assume that 
many of those are based on informal settlements.48 
The other major starting point for informal agreements is 
dismissal. According to section 153 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, a misdemeanor can be dismissed on the ground of 
insignificance by the prosecution with the agreement of the court 
if there is only minor culpability and no public interest in 
prosecution.49 Once the trial has commenced, the court too can 
dismiss the case with the agreement of both the prosecutor and 
the defendant. This provision is also an exception to the 
principle of compulsory prosecution. 
Initially, section 153 could be used only under very 
restricted circumstances, and practitioners asked to widen its 
remit. At the insistence of the legal community, in 1974 section 
153a was introduced in order to fight mass petty crime. This 
 
44. See Werner Schmidt-Hieber, Vereinbarungen im Strafverfahren [Informal 
Arrangements in Criminal Proceedings], 1985 NJW 1017, 1017. 
45. STPO , Apr. 7, 1987, BGBL. I 1074, as amended, § 407. 
46. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 56. 
47. See id. at 66. 
48. BERND SCHÜNEMANN, ABSPRACHEN IM STRAFVERFAHREN?—GRUNDLAGEN, 
GEGENSTÄNDE UND GRENZEN [AGREEMENTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS?—FOUNDATIONS, 
OBJECTS AND LIMITS] B153 n.461 (1990). There are German states where more cases are 
handled with the order than by trial. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 65. 
49. STPO, Apr. 7, 1987, BGBL. I 1074, as amended, § 153. 
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provision enables the prosecutor to refrain from pressing some 
or all charges, even when there is an interest in prosecuting, if 
this interest can be overridden by the defendant fulfilling certain 
conditions, usually by paying a sum to charity.50 Section 153a was 
at first criticized harshly as an “introduction of the American plea 
bargaining,” “shady horse trading,” “whispering procedure,” and 
“buying-off procedure.”51 However, this rule was not a new 
creation. The legislature in fact followed an existing informal 
practice to assume that the public interest in prosecution can be 
met as soon as the accused obeys the prosecution’s directive. It is 
an example of how courtroom actors extended a legal provision 
to such an extent that the legislature saw itself compelled to 
adjust the law to the lawyers rather than the other way round. 
This turned out to become the common pattern for the 
development of informal agreements in Germany. 
Although the legislature followed the demands of 
practitioners and formalized negotiations to some extent, 
courtroom actors kept operating beyond the new legal 
framework. Section 153a is restricted to misdemeanor offences 
and cases with low culpability and strong evidence. 
Nevertheless, this provision is excessively used in large-scale 
proceedings, which are neither mass nor petty crime,52 and the 
restrictions are usually bypassed.53 In 1993, the provision 
extended the restriction of minor guilt by stating that “the 
seriousness of the guilt does not require the contrary.”54 Once 
again, legislation followed the common practice of extending the 
criteria beyond the law.55 Section 153a is today frequently used as 
a basis for informal settlements. Especially during the 
preliminary investigation, it is common for the courtroom actors 
 
50. According to section 153a(2), if there is already an indictment, the court can 
take the same decision with the consent of the defendant and the prosecutor. Id. § 153a. 
51. See Schmidt-Hieber, supra note 24, at 50. 
52. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 28. 
53. See Herrmann, supra note 26, at 775. 
54. STPO, Apr. 7, 1987, BGBL. I 1074, as amended, § 153a. Interestingly, the 
legislation did not take this opportunity to address informal settlements one or way or 
the other. 
55. See Schünemann, supra note 31, at 1896. The same is true for sections 154 and 
154a, which are sometimes applied if the court wants to reward a confession or 
withdrawal from motion for admission of evidence, even if the requirements are not 
strictly fulfilled. See RÖNNAU, supra note 1, at 32. 
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to agree that the investigation will cease if the accused pays a 
fine.56 
In practice, section 153a can be extended to favor or to 
disadvantage defendants. It is to their disadvantage that the 
application of section 153a violates the rights of the accused in 
cases where there is insufficient suspicion of a criminal act,57 and 
the presumption of innocence should mean that there is no 
prosecution at all. As in England and Wales, the common 
practice of exchanging a dismissal for a confession or waiver of 
appeal can result in the prosecutor charging a more serious 
offense simply to have more substance with which to bargain.58 
More often, however, section 153a is extended in favor of the 
accused, particularly for economic crimes when section 153a is 
applied even when there is more than just minor culpability.59 In 
order to do this the case is often redefined to fit the 
requirements of section 153a; perjury, for example, might be 
reframed as the less serious offense of false unsworn statement.60 
A. The Context of Informal Negotiations 
Informal settlements in Germany occur most often when the 
case involves complicated questions of evidence or law. The more 
a court is overworked, the more willing it is to avoid complicated 
cases.61 Schünemann found in his research that 77% of judges, 
72% of prosecutors, and 51% of defense lawyers favor informal 
settlement if the case has difficult legal issues.62 If there are 
problems of evidence, 91% of the judges, 90% of the prosecutors, 
and 53% of defense lawyers in the study preferred an informal 
agreement.63 This is especially true for large-scale proceedings 
where countless documents and witness statements have to be 
analyzed. Frequently, cases are so technical that the court is 
 
56. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 56. 
57. See SCHÜNEMANN, supra note 48, at B19. 
58. See id. at B109. 
59. See RÖNNAU, supra note 1, at 37. 
60. See Hans Dahs, §153a StPO—ein „Allheilmittel“ der Strafrechtspflege [§153a 
Criminal Procedure Code—A “Panacea” for the Criminal Justice System],1996 NJW 1192, 1192. 
61. See Deal, supra note 20, at 550. 
62. See STEFAN BRAUN, DIE ABSPRACHE IM DEUTSCHEN STRAFVERFAHREN [THE 
AGREEMENT IN GERMAN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS] 11 (1998) (summarizing 
Schünemann’s research). 
63. See id. 
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dependent on expensive experts’ statements. All these factors 
mean great expense and delay for the trial and increase the 
interest in informal procedures. 
Further, the relationship between the participants is a 
crucial factor in pursuing informal negotiations.64 Like plea 
bargaining in England and Wales, informal agreements in 
Germany are based on personal relationships of trust. The better 
the participants know each other and the more positive their 
previous experiences with each other have been, the more 
straightforward the negotiations will be. The older the 
relationship between the prosecution and defense lawyer, the 
more emphasis they will put on cooperation rather than contest. 
Sometimes the negotiations even embrace different cases with 
different defendants and concessions in one case are rewarded in 
another case. This basic element of trust between professionals is 
the reason agreements are seldom breached although legally 
they are not binding. If, however, the agreement falls apart, the 
other parties to the settlement will feel their trust violated and 
future negotiations will be threatened.65 Since some private 
defense lawyers are dependent on the court to get them 
appointed as defense counsels, they are taking a personal risk 
that the defendants will keep their promises.66 It is said that some 
courts even have “blacklists” of lawyers who did not keep their 
agreement. Because of this concern, defense lawyers often do not 
let their clients know the details of the deal, so that the 
defendants cannot obstruct the negotiations.67 This also prevents 
the defendant from complaining if the sentence is higher than 
that which was agreed upon by the parties.68 
The characteristics of the defendant are likewise decisive. 
According to Schünemann’s report, 76% of practitioners stated 
that juvenile defendants showed an increased willingness to agree 
to informal settlements compared with adult defendants, 89% 
confirmed a higher willingness of elderly defendants, and 91% 
stated that defendants with no previous conviction are more 
 
64. See id. at 13. 
65. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 72. 
66. In some cases, the defendant changed her defense counsel and appealed 
against the sentence, thus breaching the initial promise not to appeal. 
67. BGH July 4, 1990, NJW 3030, 1990. 
68. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 72. 
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ready to reach agreements.69 Only 36% of the practitioners 
thought that defendants in a weak financial situation would be 
willing to reach settlements, and 29% considered that those with 
little education would be interested to come to an informal 
agreement.70 According to Deal, upper- or middle-class 
defendants are more likely to favor reaching settlements with the 
court and prosecutors, and judges are more likely to reach an 
agreement with the defense lawyer if the defendant appears 
sympathetic to the judges.71 Because of courts’ interest in 
compensation, white-collar criminals are more likely to be 
offered the opportunity to negotiate because they can offer 
higher sums.72 Whether the gender of defendant, defense 
counsel, judge, or prosecutor plays any role is not addressed in 
any empirical research. Another aspect considered by judges and 
prosecutors is, as in England and Wales, the victim’s interest, 
especially in sexual crimes. Courts also favor informal settlements 
that lead to confessions and waivers of evidence production—and 
thus protect the victim from having to appear in court and give 
evidence.73 
Defense lawyers favor settlements especially in cases in which 
there is a high probability of conviction (96% of the lawyers in 
Schünemann’s survey mentioned this reason).74 Particularly in 
this situation, the defense lawyer can gain some reduction of the 
sentence in a case that would otherwise be hopeless. An informal 
negotiation does not just demonstrate how much influence the 
lawyer has in court, but also how the settlement can be sold to 
the client as a successful outcome. Other examples of situations 
in which defense lawyers favor informal settlements are when 
they want to protect their client from public exposure (83%) and 
in cases where a high sentence is expected (83%).75 
If not all parties favor an agreement, courtroom actors 
might employ a number of different strategies in order to impose 
 
69. See BRAUN, supra note 62, at 10–11. However, this is only indirect data, as the 
defendants themselves were not asked. This author believes that a public figure is very 
much interested in being spared a public trial. 
70. Id. at 10. 
71. Deal, supra note 20, at 549. 
72. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 28. 
73. See SCHÜNEMANN, supra note 48, at B23. 
74. See BRAUN, supra note 62, at 11 (crediting Schünemann’s research). 
75. See id. 
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pressure on the others to settle. To increase its negotiating 
power, the prosecution might “over-charge” the defendant in 
order to later be able to offer to withdraw offences from the 
accusation.76 Another strategy to put pressure on the defense is 
to take advantage of the fact that only the prosecution can 
request a dismissal or a penal order. Accordingly, the prosecutor 
can combine an offer of dismissal under section 153a with a 
warning that this is the last chance for settling.77 Moreover, the 
prosecutor can indicate that a refusal to accept an agreement 
could lead to a higher sentence recommendation. Obviously, it is 
not right to punish the defendant with a more severe sentence 
for objecting to a negotiation. However, since the exact final 
sentence is nearly impossible to anticipate, it is very difficult to 
evaluate whether the final sentence is more severe because of the 
earlier rejection to settle. An increased sentence might even be 
an unintended consequence.78 
Defense lawyers, on the other hand, use the defendant’s 
extensive procedural safeguards to threaten the courts with an 
enormous number of interim appeal motions and evidenciary 
hearings that are expensive and time consuming to initiate an 
informal settlement of the case.79 They bombard the court with 
motions of different kinds, which the court cannot reject without 
risking an appeal. Thus the trial is artificially prolonged, just to 
induce settlement in order to shorten the procedure.80 The same 
tactic can be used with motions to disqualify the judge.81 
Compared to England and Wales, the defense counsel in 
Germany is in an advantageous position because it has access to 
the prosecution’s dossiers, which are not restricted by disclosure 
rules.82 
 
76. See Andrew Ashworth & Meredith Blake, Some Ethical Issues in Prosecuting and 
Defending Criminal Cases, 1998 CRIM. L. REV. 16, 28; Christian Lüdemann, Land without 
Plea Bargaining? How the Germans Do It. Results of an Empirical Study, 17 
EUROCRIMINOLOGY 119, 122 (1998). 
77. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 63. 
78. See id. at 67. 
79. See LEIGH & ZEDNER, supra note 9, at 41. Wassermann speaks of a boycott and 
even a sabotage of the criminal procedure. Rudolf Wasserman, Von der Schwierigkeit, 
Strafverfahren in angemessener Zeit durch Urteil abzuschliessen [The Difficulty of Concluding the 
Criminal Procedure through Judgment without Undue Delay ], 1994 NJW 1106. 
80. See GERLACH, supra note 40, at 24. 
81. See STPO, Apr. 7, 1987, BGBL. I 1074, as amended, §§ 24, 26. 
82. In fact, at trial the defense lawyer has the same dossier as the prosecution and 
the court. 
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There are many examples of abuses on both sides, and there 
are even known cases in which defendants were put under grave 
pressure to confess to crimes that they denied having 
committed.83 In one case, the lawyer forced the prosecution into 
a settlement declaring that he knew that there was a serious basis 
for appeal, without revealing the court’s mistake. The prosecutor 
had a choice between risking the judgment being reversed by the 
appeal court or engaging in negotiations with the defense.84 
Unfortunately, the literature has to rely on anecdotal evidence as 
there is no systematic empirical research on the extent of severe 
abuses. 
B. Content of Agreements 
The defendant (usually through his counsel) can offer to 
confess to all or parts of the accusations, to testify against a co-
defendant,85 to waive a motion for the admission of evidence, or 
to waive the right to file an appeal.86 In addition, the defendant 
might promise to undertake to pay court costs or indemnification 
payments87 or to waive his own requests for any compensation.88 
As in England and Wales, the center of informal negotiations in 
Germany is the confession. However, as in the English discourse 
on plea bargaining, an essential question is what effect a 
confession should have on the sentence.  
It is generally accepted that a remorseful confession should 
generate a sentence reduction. In the case of an informal 
agreement, however, it is more likely that the cause for the 
confession is the expected sentence reduction rather than true 
remorse. Schmidt-Hieber argues that the possibility of remorse is 
at least not ruled out and that one should account for the 
principle of in dubio pro reo.89 Schünemann counters that the 
 
83. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 77. 
84. See Deal, supra note 20, at 548. 
85. See BRAUN, supra note 62, at 6. 
86. For the question of the extent to which such a waiver is binding, see infra p. 
318. 
87. See BRAUN, supra note 62, at 6. 
88. See Chritstoph Rückel, Verteidigertaktik bei Verständigungen und Vereinbarungen im 
Strafverfahren—Mit Checkliste [Defender Tactics in Negotiations and Agreements in Criminal 
Proceedings—With Checklist], 1987 NSTZ 297, 303. 
89. Werner Schmidt-Hieber, Der strafprozessuale „Vergleich“—eine Illegale Kungelei? 
[Criminal Procedure “Settlement”—Illegal Wheeling and Dealing?], 1986 STV 355, 356 
[hereinafter Schidt-Hieber, Vergleich]. Otherwise, so he claims, there would be acting 
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confession in this case depends on the offer of an advantage and 
therefore cannot indicate unconditional remorse.90 On the other 
hand, Schmidt-Hieber stresses that even without remorse the 
confession’s value for establishing the facts is sufficient for 
mitigating the sentence.91 Moreover, the Federal High Court of 
Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) has held that a confession is a 
mitigating factor, even if it is given primarily for tactical 
reasons.92 Additionally, according to Widmaier, the ethical effort 
of admitting to the offence in front of the court, the public, and 
to oneself should be rewarded.93 On the other hand, especially in 
the areas of financial, environmental, and similar crimes, 
defendants cannot be absolutely convinced of their 
blameworthiness because the question often does not depend on 
the facts (as in traditional crime) but rather on definitions and 
interpretation of the elements of the offence by the courts.94 To 
express deep remorse is difficult under these circumstances. 
Even more pressing is the relationship between confession 
and truth. As was shown earlier, the principle of substantive truth 
dictates that the judge examine every confession as to its 
truthfulness and consider additional evidence if needed. 
However, research reveals that informal agreements drastically 
undermine this principle. When Schünemann asked judges 
whether they would accept a confession even in a situation where 
the trial had not brought up enough evidence for a conviction, 
seventy-two percent showed themselves ready to accept the 
confession and to take it as the only basis for conviction.95 The 
principle of substantive truth is considerably undermined further 
if an informal agreement consists of a so-called “slim confession,” 
which means that the defendant only confirms the already known 
evidence rather than revealing any new facts.96 This kind of 
 
skills at play in trials. Werner Schmidt-Hieber, Absprachen im Strafprozeß—Rechtsbeugung 
und Klassenjustiz? [Informal Agreements in the Criminal Process—Perversion of Justice and 
Class Justice?], 1990 DRIZ 321, 321 [hereinafter Schidt-Hieber, Absprachen im Strafprozeß]. 
90. SCHÜNEMANN, supra note 48, at B112. 
91. Schmidt-Hieber, Vergleich, supra note 89, at 356. 
92. See BGH Aug. 8, 1997, 28 JURISTISCHE RUNDSCHAU [JR] 245 (248), 1998. 
93. Widmaier, supra note 22, at 358. 
94. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 76. 
95. SCHÜNEMANN, supra note 48, at B23; see also Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher 
Regional Court] Jan. 24, 1989, BREMEN [StV] 145, 1989 (presiding judge admitted not 
having read the file before initiating negotiations with the defendant). 
96. See SCHÜNEMANN, supra note 48, at B83. 
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confession is usually formulated by the defense counsel97 and 
then is just confirmed by the defendant. Defendants favor slim 
confessions because they avoid having to release details, that 
might bring about a harsher sentence or be used in a civil action 
by the victim.98 The court too might favor a less elaborate 
statement of the facts because more details of the crime could 
lead to suspicion among the public who might not understand 
the mild sentence or probationary custody.99 In this respect, the 
argument that a confession deserves a sentence reduction 
because it facilitates fact-finding is no longer applicable. 
The second form of offer by the defendant is to waive or 
withdraw a motion for the admission of evidence in order to 
shorten the proceeding.100 The defense might also agree not to 
challenge the admission of certain evidence by the prosecution 
or the court.101 In this way, defendants renounce a considerable 
part of their procedural rights. Sometimes the defense offers 
additional remedies, such as a promise to improve the 
environmental protection at its factory or to waive administrative 
procedures. 
Most informal settlements also include the waiver of the 
right to file an appeal.102 Although any promise to waive the right 
to appeal made by the defendant before the final conviction is 
not legally binding,103 it is only rarely broken. Even though there 
are legal remedies against a sentence based on an informal 
settlement, defendants rarely use these. There are three possible 
reasons why defendants do not challenge the conviction. First, 
they may be satisfied with the outcome to which they have 
agreed. Second, they might be reluctant to spend more time, 
money, and effort on another process. The third and most 
serious reason is that the defense counsel might not have 
informed the client about the legal remedies against the 
 
97. The defense counsel chooses the formulations carefully in order to avoid any 
civil action. 
98. See SCHÜNEMANN, supra note 48, at B83. 
99. See id. at B26. 
100. See BRAUN, supra note 62, at 6. 
101. See Schmidt-Hieber, supra note 44, at 1017. 
102. See Küpper & Bode, supra note 12, at 353. 
103. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 75. 
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settlement, or even about the existence of the agreement itself, 
which counsel negotiated on its own.104 
Besides a dismissal or a penal order, the prime offer the 
prosecution can make to the defendant is to recommend a lower 
sentence to the court.105 As in England and Wales, the result of a 
settlement can also be downgrading the charge, e.g., from 
attempted manslaughter to serious injury106 or from perpetrator 
to abettor.107 However, the court is not bound “by the offense’s 
evaluation which formed the basis of the order opening the main 
proceedings.”108 This means that if the evidence during the 
hearing shows that an act has to be evaluated as the higher 
charge the court has to convict accordingly. If, however, the 
court accepts a slim confession without further investigation it 
will not have any indication that a higher charge might be more 
appropriate. 
In addition to a sentence reduction, the accused might be 
offered release from custody109 or other coercive measures.110 
Also, the exclusion of the public from the hearing can be offered 
in order to maintain the defendant’s privacy and professional 
reputation. Especially in white-collar crimes, the publicity of a 
criminal procedure can cause serious financial losses owing to 
the damaged reputation of the defendant or his business. Since 
the public can only be excluded from the court hearing if the 
requirements of section 169ff of the Courts Constitution Act111 
are met, informal strategies, such as the scheduling of the trial 
for late afternoon, or not passing information to the judicial 
press service, are used to avoid an audience in the court room.112 
 
104. See Schünemann, supra note 31, at 1900. 
105. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 68. On the duty of the prosecutor to 
recommend a sentence to the judge, see JULIA ALISON FIONDA, PUBLIC PROSECUTORS 
AND DISCRETION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 148 (1995). 
106. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 63. 
107. See Hassemer & Hippler, supra note 12, at 360. 
108. See STPO, Apr. 7, 1987, BGBL. I 1074, as amended, § 264. 
109. See Schmidt-Hieber, supra note 44, at 1017. 
110. See BRAUN, supra note 62, at 6. 
111. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [GVG][Courts Constitution Act], Sept. 12, 1950, 
BGBL. I at 1077. 
112. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 18. 
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C. Criticisms 
The main criticism regarding plea bargaining is not that the 
accused is unduly pressured, as is claimed in England and 
Wales.113 Although such cases might occur, there is no evidence 
that this happens more than just exceptionally. Until last year, 
the largest part of the academic discourse instead dealt with the 
question of whether informal agreements are reconcilable with 
the German Constitution, the general principles of criminal 
procedure, and certain provisions of the Criminal Procedure 
Code and the Penal Code.114 Principles that were claimed to have 
been infringed are: the presumption of innocence, the right to a 
fair trial, the right to a lawful judge, the right to judicial hearing, 
the principle of public trial, the principle of substantive truth 
and court investigation, the principles of immediacy and orality, 
the privilege against self-incrimination, the principle of 
compulsory prosecution, the duty of presence of the accused, 
and the prohibition of undue pressure.115 
Whereas most academics held informal settlements to be an 
illegal practice, most practitioners were convinced of their 
compatibility with the German legal system.116 Even though in 
the early 1980s the topic of informal case dispositions was 
considered explosive and disreputable,117 many authors ascribed 
legality to this practice long before the introduction of the new 
legislation in 2009. The main points can only be summarized 
here, but it is evident that the discourse very much resembled the 
plea bargaining debate in Anglo-American criminal justice 
systems. The main arguments supporting the legality of informal 
agreements were that the Criminal Procedure Code did not 
forbid them expressly, that there were other provisions which 
allowed negotiations, that a decision based on consensus helped 
 
113. MICHAEL MCCONVILLE ET AL., STANDING ACCUSED: THE ORGANISATION AND 
PRACTICES OF CRIMINAL DEFENCE LAWYERS IN BRITAIN 63–64 (1994). 
114. See Thomas Swenson, The German “Plea Bargaining” Debate, PACE INT’L L. REV. 
373, 383, 393, 400–01 (1995). 
115. It is also discussed that courtroom actors engaging in informal agreements 
might commit offenses themselves. It is argued that participating professionals might 
violate section 336 (perversion of justice), sections 258 and 258a (preventing 
prosecution of a guilty person), or section 240 (duress) of the Penal Code. Likewise the 
betrayal of the client’s interests (section 356) and breach of the duty to observe secrecy 
(section 203) are discussed in the literature. See id. at 425. 
116. See Herrmann, supra note 26, at 775. 
117. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 48. 
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to achieve a fair and accepted outcome, and that the practice 
had been so well established that it was not reversible anyway.118 
The major arguments against informal procedures were 
that, as long as the Criminal Procedure Code did not allow them 
explicitly, they were illegal, that they violated most major 
principles of the criminal process, that they compromised the 
role of the trial, and that they led to arbitrary results with a class 
bias.119 Although informal negotiations played a vital role in 
Germany’s criminal justice system for at least forty years, the 
literature shows that the legality of informal agreements was 
highly contested in relation to numerous principles and 
provisions. It is interesting to observe how many arguments some 
authors have advanced to show that informal procedures are 
legal,120 while before 1982 no one doubted their illegality. Only 
after it was no longer possible to deny that informal negotiations 
were more than rare exceptions were justifications sought.121 
Otherwise, one would have had to recognize and admit that 
judges made wide-scale use of illegal means.122 
Unfortunately, the discussion of legality failed to address 
broader questions, such as the actual balance of judicial and 
legislative power in Germany, the relation between work quotas 
and law obedience, the role of legal principles and values, and 
the relationship between substantive and procedural criminal 
law. Rather, the debate concentrated exclusively on the question 
of legality and the need for regulation. This gap in the discussion 
is regrettable because, as is argued below, it seems very 
questionable whether legislation can heal the rift between the 
traditional theoretical principles of the formal German criminal 
procedure and the new informal practice that is created to 
shortcut this procedure. 
 
118. See generally RALF TSCHERWINKA, ABSPRACHEN IM STRAFPROZEß [AGREEMENTS 
IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS] (1995) (discussing the arguments supporting the legality of 
informal agreements). 
119. See Swenson, supra note 114, at 400. 
120. See TSCHERWINKA, supra note 118. 
121. See BUSSMANN, supra note 16, at 90 (“The knowledge of the existence and the 
significance of an informal practice changed its legal interpretation.”). 
122. See id. at 126–27. This is even supported in many other areas of law, such as 
civil law or administrative law, where agreements are legal. 
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IV. ATTEMPTED RESTRICTIONS BY COURT RULINGS 
In financial crimes, informal settlements have been carried 
out for years despite of the fact that all participants were aware 
that the Federal High Court of Justice would not accept this 
practice.123 Since a crucial part of the agreement is usually the 
waiver of the right of appeal, only a handful of higher court 
rulings dealt with informal settlements. But because of an 
increasing number of failed agreements (usually claiming a 
violation of the principle of freedom from coercion under 
section 136a)124 the Federal High Court of Justice and even the 
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) (“Court”) 
were eventually forced to provide some rulings on this practice.125 
The first landmark decision was delivered by the Federal 
Constitutional Court in 1987 when the appellant claimed that his 
constitutional rights were violated.126 In the preliminary 
procedure, the Court denied having jurisdiction over the present 
case about an informal agreement as it could not identify any 
drastic violation of constitutional rights.127 The Court held that 
negotiations outside the court in which the negotiating parties 
discuss the prognosis of the case were not generally forbidden as 
long as the law was respected.128 In this case there was no 
violation of any procedural law because the presentation of 
evidence at trial was nearly completed and the final sentence was 
commensurate with the offender’s guilt.129 In addition, the Court 
stated that the free choice of the defendant had not been 
unlawfully violated.130 However, like the UK Court of Appeal in 
Turner,131 the Federal Constitutional Court established a set of 
 
123. See id. at 128. 
124. Section 136a of the Code of Criminal Procedure states:  
The accused’s freedom to make up his mind and to manifest his will shall not 
be impaired by ill-treatment, induced fatigue, physical interference, 
administration of drugs, torment, deception or hypnosis. Coercion may be 
used only as far as this is permitted by criminal procedure law. Threatening 
the accused with measures not permitted under its provisions or holding out 
the prospect of an advantage not envisaged by statute shall be prohibited. 
 STPO, Apr. 7, 1987, RGBL. 1074, as amended, § 136a. 
125. For a summary see Swenson, supra note 114, at 419. 
126. BGH Jan. 27, 1987, NSTZ 419, 1987. 
127. 9 NSTZ 419 (419). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. R v. Turner, [1970] 2 Q.B. 321 at 326–27 (Eng.). 
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rules under which informal settlements could be accepted.132 All 
participants have to be involved, and any negotiations, including 
their contents, have to be set out in the main trial hearing.133 The 
settlement must not include any ultra vires promises and the 
agreed outcome must be lawful and justifiable.134 Further, 
although the agreement is not binding, there must be no 
divergence without reason.135 Finally, following the principle of 
substantive truth, the defendant’s confession has to be examined 
by the court to determine if it is genuine.136 In setting out these 
limitations, the court seemed to acknowledge the general validity 
of informal settlements.137 However, opponents have pointed out 
that only in these very restricted circumstances would 
negotiations be allowed; the majority of informal settlements 
would fall outside these limits and are therefore illegal. 
The Federal High Court of Justice passed a number of 
confusing rulings regarding specific aspects of informal 
agreements without, however, addressing whether the practice in 
general was permissible. In 1989, the court held that the trial 
judge was allowed to contact the parties outside the courtroom, 
but it did not deal with the question of whether this contact 
could amount to any negotiations with the parties.138 The court 
made clear that if the trial court raised certain sentence 
expectations, the defendant could rely on them, but it was not 
clear whether the trial court was allowed to raise such 
expectations in the first place.139 In a 1990 tax evasion case the 
court held that the prosecution’s offer to drop some charges if 
the defendant accepted a penal order would not preclude 
proceedings against the withdrawn charges later but would be 
considered mitigating circumstances.140 In another case decided 
the same year,141 the court again avoided dealing explicitly with 
the legality of informal settlements in general, but held that in 
the present case the judges had been biased because they 
 
132. BRAUN, supra note 62, at 128. 
133. See id. 
134. See id. 
135. See Swenson, supra note 114, at 399. 
136. See id. 
137. See id. at 419. 
138. See BGH June 7, 1989, NJW 2270 (2271), 1989. 
139. Id. 
140. BGH June 7, 1989, NJW 1924, 1990. 
141. BGH July 4, 1990, NJW 3030 (3031), 1990. 
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negotiated with the two co-defendants but not with the appellant, 
who was not informed about the settlement. One year later, the 
court declared that informal agreements contradict the rule of 
law,142 and in another decision that year, it clarified that the 
agreement does not bind the trial court, as this could render 
judges biased.143 Further, it criticized the practice of informal 
negotiations in the strongest terms.144 Any informal contact 
should be limited to “feeling out” the parties, without dealing 
with questions of sentencing or probation.145 However, only a 
couple of months later a different Senate146 of the same court 
disallowed an informal settlement for specific reasons, rather 
than reasoning that they were generally impermissible.147 In 1993 
it was confirmed that extra-trial settlements would not necessarily 
prejudice the court’s judgment.148  
The decisions of the Federal High Court of Justice on the 
practice of informal negotiations have been ambiguous and the 
interpretations have been consequently debated.149 The court 
seemed to oscillate between criminal procedural principles on 
the one hand and the pragmatic necessity of informal 
agreements on the other. In an obiter dictum the court stated the 
incompatibility of informal settlements with the legal system,150 
but made a contrary ruling soon after.151 It explained that the 
solution lay in a linguistic distinction between illegal 
“accordance” (Absprache) and legal “understanding” 
(Verständigungen), but the court did not provide any criteria to 
distinguish between the two forms in practice.152 
In a landmark decision in 1997, the Fourth Senate of the 
Federal High Court of Justice declared that informal settlements 
were “not prohibited” if they were within certain limits.153 The 
 
142. BGH Sept. 24, 1990, NSTZ 348, 1991. 
143. See BGH Jan. 23, 1991, NJW 1692 (1693), 1991. 
144. See id. at 1694. 
145. See id. 
146. The Federal High Court of Justice is divided into five chambers called Senates. 
147. BGH Oct. 30, 1991, 8 NJW 519, 1992. 
148. BGH Oct. 19, 1993, 19 NJW 1293, 1994. 
149. See Küpper & Bode, supra note 12, at 395. 
150. BGH Oct. 30, 1991, 37 BGHST 298, 1991. 
151. BGH Oct. 19, 1993, 4 NSTZ 153 (196), 1994. 
152. Id. 
153. BGH Aug. 28, 1997, NJW 86, 1998 (where the defendant was charged with a 
hundred counts of sexual abuse and rape). 
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negotiation has to take place after the trial has started, although 
discussions in the course of preparation are allowed if the result 
is revealed during the main trial;154 all participants (including co-
defendants) have to be informed; and the trial court is not 
relieved of its obligation to find the objective truth and thus has 
to investigate the credibility of the confession. As a consequence, 
the determination of guilt of any offense must not be part of the 
negotiation. Further, a confession made as part of the informal 
negotiation has a mitigating effect, but the court is not allowed to 
indicate the exact sentence. However, it is permissible to indicate 
the maximum penalty that could be expected. Threats or undue 
promises are forbidden. The same is true for a waiver of the right 
to appeal by the defense.155 As will be shown later, it is especially 
the last rule that is generally disregarded in practice.156  
Since this decision, the Federal High Court of Justice 
repeatedly emphasized that although the practice of informal 
negotiations was developed praetor legem, it is now a necessary 
part of the German criminal justice system and thus permissible 
within the restrictions of the 1997 decision.157 However, these 
guidelines were met with incomprehension by the legal 
community, which felt that the guidelines would not address 
their concerns. The restrictive limits of the ruling did not reflect 
the practice of informal negotiations and practitioners felt that 
the Federal High Court of Justice was too remote from the day-to-
day work of trial courts to understand the practical necessities.  
The 1997 decision did not prove to be the final clarifying 
decision for which many had been waiting. Seven years later, 
there were still discrepancies between the five criminal Senates of 
the Federal High Court of Justice regarding informal 
agreements.158 In 2004, the Federal High Court of Justice 
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examined the validity of waivers of appeal as part of the 
agreement.159 The Joint Senate confirmed once again the general 
permissibility of informal agreements within the guidelines of the 
1997 decision,160 but limited the waiver of appeal.161 The court 
made clear that if the judgment is based on an informal 
agreement, any waiver of appeal by the defendant was not 
binding unless the defendant has been informed by the court 
that he or she was not bound by any promises to waive the right 
to appeal made previously as part of the agreement (the so-called 
“qualified information”).162 Moreover, the court declared that 
“the limits of judicial lawmaking” had been reached, and called 
for action by the legislature.163 
V. THE NEW LEGISLATION 
On May 28, 2009, the German Federal Parliament followed 
the call of the Federal High Court of Justice by passing the Bill 
for the Regulation of Agreements in the Criminal Procedure, 
which formalizes agreements during the criminal trial.164 Except 
for some minor changes, the legislation largely follows the 
guidelines set out by the Federal High Court of Justice. A new 
section, 257c,165 was added to the German Criminal Procedure 
Code, to allow for and regulates agreements without—so it is 
claimed166—infringing on the principles of the German criminal 
procedure.167  
The new provision regulates the agreement between the 
court, the prosecution, and the defense.168 An agreement 
becomes valid when the court announces the possible content of 
the agreement and both the prosecution and defense consent.169 
The legal status of agreements that have been made before or 
outside of trial is unclear. Section 160b allows for 
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communications between prosecution and defense before trial 
(“if they appear to be suitable to further the proceedings”) which 
need to be read into the record,170 but it is unclear whether 
binding agreements between the prosecution and defense 
without the involvement of the court are prohibited, or simply 
not part of the new regulation.  
The new provision is aimed at preserving the principle of 
substantive truth. Only if the court is convinced that the offense 
has been fully investigated and there are grounds for believing 
that the admission of guilt is genuine can the judgment follow. 
This confirms the Federal High Court of Justice ruling that a 
mere “formal admission” (in which the defendant only admits 
guilt but does not make any statement about the facts) does not 
suffice for a judgment.171 It follows that the settlement must not 
include an agreement about a determination of guilt.172 This 
provision also excludes any negotiations that in the common-law 
system would be called charge bargaining. However, charge 
bargaining between prosecution and defense very likely occurs 
before the trial. It has been shown that negotiations about 
different charges are invaluable to both defense and prosecution, 
and it is very questionable whether section 257c(2) will be able to 
end these kinds of negotiations.173 
All negotiations before and during trial have to be 
announced during the main trial hearing and read into the 
record.174 The recording of all negotiations and agreements 
promotes transparency and ensures that all arrangements can be 
revised by an appellate court. According to the new section 
273(1a), even the absence of any agreement needs to be 
recorded.175 This is an important step to move “plea bargaining” 
out of the shadows of informality and into the field of regulated, 
transparent, and controllable formal procedure. 
To ensure the principle of fair trial and protect the 
defendant, section 257c(4) mandates that unless new facts 
emerge (be they related to the crime itself or the behavior of the 
defendant after the agreement), the trial court is bound by its 
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initial prognosis of punishment.176 This stipulation protects 
defendant expectations but ensures that the final sentence 
reflects the known facts and not merely the agreement. If the 
trial court feels that it cannot sentence according to its initial 
sentence prognosis the admission of guilt cannot be used as 
evidence. This rule attempts to restore the status quo, particularly 
the presumption of innocence, that existed before the 
agreement. However, it will be very difficult for the trial court177 
to disregard a confession after it has previously accepted it, which 
it can only do if it was convinced, according to the concept of 
substantive truth, that it was genuine. One can easily imagine a 
situation where the defendant submits a credible confession that 
concurs with other evidence but later new aggravating facts arise 
and the trial court cannot justify its initial indication of 
maximum sentence. In this case the agreement falls apart, the 
court is not bound by its promise, and the defendant’s confession 
is presumed not to have been made. It is not realistic to expect 
the court to disregard a confession which it was convinced was 
true simply because additional aggravating facts have arisen. Even 
if the court is able to disregard completely the earlier credible 
admission of guilt, if the defendant is convicted it will be hard for 
him as well as the public to believe that the court was not 
prejudiced by the previous confession. 
The second central aspect of the new law concerns the 
waiver of appeal. Following the guidelines of the Federal High 
Court of Justice, according to sections 35a and 302(1), a waiver of 
appeal must not be part of any agreement.178 Further, whenever a 
judgment involves an agreement, any waiver of appeal (even if it 
was not part of the agreement) is only valid if the defendant has 
received the qualified information explained above.179 This 
means if a case involves an agreement and the defendant waives 
his right to appeal, the court has to explain to the defendant that 
if this waiver was part of the deal, the court is no longer bound by 
it.180 Only if the defendant adheres to the waiver after being thus 
informed by the court does it become valid. The aim of this strict 
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rule is to ensure that agreements are open to revision by the 
appellate courts. The hope is that this judiciary control will 
guarantee that all agreements are within the legal boundaries 
and thus establish legitimacy for this practice.  
However, like the Federal High Court of Justice before it, 
the legislature has overlooked the flaw of this reasoning. The 
waiver of an appeal by the defendant has potentially two 
invaluable benefits for the trial judge. First, without the prospect 
of an appeal, the judgment does not need to be formulated with 
the same care as if it were open to review by a higher court. 
Second, every appeal is a challenge to the rightfulness and 
quality of the judge’s decision. The fewer cases of an individual 
judge that are reviewed by a higher court, the fewer decisions are 
overruled, which is important for the judge’s career appraisals. 
The defense lawyer, too, is unlikely to pursue an appeal that will 
damage the trust-based working relationship with the court and 
the prosecutor, and might threaten future negotiations. Thus a 
judicial review of cases based on informal agreements is not in 
the interest of the practitioners, and it does not come as a 
surprise that this rule was regularly disregarded. It is more than 
questionable whether the new legislation will be able to change 
this. 
Another problem related to the waiver of appeal is the time 
limit for the defendant. If the defendant declares a waiver of 
appeal without receiving the qualified information and then 
decides to appeal after all, he can do so only within the ordinary 
time limits for appeals, which is one week after pronouncement 
of the judgment.181 The Federal High Court of Justice explicitly 
ruled that the time limit cannot be extended for defendants who 
have entered an agreement because this would put them in a 
better position than defendants who have not participated in a 
settlement.182 In practice this means that defendants who are not 
informed by the court that they are not bound by their initial 
waiver of appeal can only file an appeal if they find out that their 
initial waiver is invalid within one week after the judgment. If the 
court and defense counsel agree to a settlement which illegally 
includes a waiver of appeal, it is doubtful that they will later 
inform the defendant that this part of the deal is not binding. As 
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was argued before, an appeal is not in the interest of any of the 
courtroom actors. The future will show if courts will take 
advantage of this loophole. Marsch guesses that the waiver of 
appeal will not end, but rather will only be made invisible.183  
Considering what little impact the rulings of the Federal 
High Court of Justice had on the practice of informal 
negotiations, the main question is whether the new legislation 
(which adds little substance to the existing practice) will be 
followed by the courtroom actors. Since the debate over informal 
agreements started in Germany, calls for legislative regulation of 
the practice have been voiced. It was argued that the legislature 
needed to regulate the practice and make it more formal so that 
courtroom actors would no longer need to act outside the 
Criminal Procedure Code. However, Nestler-Tremel pointed out 
that legality was only a theoretical problem, for in practice the 
defendant usually waived the right to appeal and thus withdrew 
the negotiations from any formal control.184 Besides, informal 
settlements were carried out long before practitioners even dared 
to admit it. Even if proponents later argued that informal 
agreements would fit into the German criminal law system, 
initially the participants did not believe them to be legal but used 
them on a regular basis nevertheless.185 If the judiciary developed 
its own system believing the procedure to be illegal, it is doubtful 
they would now accept regulations and restrictions.186 Meyer-
Goßner even declared that informal agreements “are going to 
shape the legal everyday life with or without legislation.”187 
Schünemann, on the other hand, disapproved of this viewpoint 
and called it an unrealistic insult to the German judiciary.188 
However, the development of relevant legislation supports 
Meyer-Goßner’s view. The dismissal was repeatedly extended 
by the legislature to follow the praetor legem development of 
the informal practice by the judiciary.189 Bussmann’s research 
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confirmed that the question of legality did not play a notable role 
for legal professionals.190 The practitioners were led by quotidian 
requirements rather than by the formal law, and consequently 
they were not particularly concerned about whether the question 
of law should be changed.191 It was not so much that the 
practitioners suppressed the praxis-law conflict, but rather that 
the formal law played an inferior role in the daily practice. When 
considering whether to initiate an informal negotiation, 
participants calculate its benefits and drawbacks, rather than its 
compatibility with the law.192 Thus formal law is replaced by an 
informal but established code of conduct.193 Widmaier made the 
reality of the practice very clear: “Settlements in criminal 
procedure do exist. They do not need to be first legalised, nor 
can they be prohibited.”194 
Drawing conclusions from this experience, it is very 
questionable whether the courtroom actors will adapt their 
practice-driven customs to the limits of section 257c. Meyer-
Goßner points out that judges and prosecutors are less likely to 
ignore legislation than judge-made law because they could 
commit the criminal offense of perversion of justice according to 
section 339 German Penal Code.195 However, this threat seems 
not to have been strong enough to prevent the judiciary and 
prosecutors from developing extensive informal practices outside 
the law of dismissal and penal order in the first place.196 Since the 
appeals courts have developed the rules which have now become 
written law, it must be expected that appeals courts will support 
the new legislation, but of course they will only have the 
opportunity to do so if the trial courts use agreements openly. 
The future will reveal whether the new legislation will 
succeed in lifting the agreements out of informality into the 
realm of formal procedure. This author has serious doubts about 
whether the formalization of a practice which derives its 
attraction from its informality can be realized. 
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VI. THE CHASM BETWEEN THEORETICAL VALUES AND 
PRACTICAL NECESSITIES 
As in England and Wales, the merits of informal 
negotiations for the German criminal process are highly 
contested. Whereas most practitioners praise the usefulness and 
even the necessity of informal procedures, many academics point 
out that this practice is not compatible with the basic values of 
the German criminal justice system. But there is a third essential 
theme which is missing in the debate. This Article argues that the 
development of informal procedures in Germany, as with plea 
bargaining in England and other common-law systems, leads to 
the development of an informal system which runs parallel to the 
formal process with neither higher courts nor legislation being 
able to prevent or control it. This opens questions not only about 
the power of the judiciary in general, but also about whose role it 
is to close the chasm between theoretical values and practical 
necessities in general. The legislature in Germany had the 
opportunity to engage in a debate about the tension between the 
two, but unfortunately did not address this question at all. 
It has been argued above that the core reason for the start of 
informal settlements in Germany was the change in the nature of 
the substantive criminal law without adaptation of the procedural 
law. Both the German Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure 
Code date from the nineteenth century when crimes were 
comparatively simple to define and generally corresponded to 
the understanding of an average person. In modern society, with 
the increasing introduction of crimes that cause danger (rather 
than harm), common sense is no longer sufficient to establish 
the boundary between permissible and criminal conduct.197 The 
main question is often not the identity of the offender, but 
whether an offense was committed in the first place. The conduct 
of the accused need not be identified, but rather interpreted. For 
example, the trial court might not need to establish whether the 
defendant has transferred money, but whether this transaction 
amounted to money laundering. This means criminal law has 
been extended to offenses that do not fit under the conventional 
 
197. See Rolf-Peter Calliess, Strafzwecke und Strafrecht—40 Jahre Grundgesetz—
Entwicklungstendenzen vom freiheitlichen zum sozial-autoritären Rechtsstaat? [Sentencing Goals 
and Criminal Law—40 Years Constitution—Developing Tendencies from Liberal to Social-
Authoritarian Constitutional State], 1989 NJW 1338, 1340. 
  
2011] FORMALIZED PLEA BARGAINING IN GERMANY 327 
criminal procedure law. Not surprisingly, the courtroom actors 
have had to adapt their way of handling these cases and court 
behavior has become less characteristic of criminal law and more 
typical of administrative law: 
Through giving up the punitive, repressive paradigm in 
favour of an economic paradigm and abandonment of 
hierarchical, authoritarian forms of interaction in favour of 
cooperative, consent orientated forms of process, criminal 
procedures become increasingly similar to administrative law 
procedures, solving conflicts of interests . . . by 
negotiation.198 
Hence, legal practice finds itself in a quandary between, on 
the one hand, formal procedural law that is still oriented toward 
the principle of material truth, and on the other hand, 
substantive criminal law, which blurs the boundaries between 
allowed behavior and criminal conduct, and thus pushes towards 
formal truth on which the participants agree. As certain 
behaviors were transferred to the more repressive criminal law, 
the criminal trial itself was replaced by informal negotiations 
where the offender can now negotiate and avoid public 
stigmatization. The fact that more and more offenses have been 
transferred from administrative law into criminal law in order to 
exercise more repressive control on white-collar crime ironically 
has had the effect that criminal courts increasingly might replace 
the trial with less repressive, consensus-oriented negotiations. 
While this is welcome in most cases by the defendant and all 
courtroom actors, it disregards the interest of the public in 
proportionate punishment and fair labeling of the crime. “The 
increasing restructuring of criminal law from a device of citizen 
protection into a flexible mechanism of state intervention is the 
wrong answer to the right question of how social risks can be 
dealt with.”199 
Rather than formally measuring the new substantive law 
against the traditional core values of criminal procedure and 
adapting one to the other, it has been left to the courtroom 
actors to square this circle. As in England and Wales, Germany’s 
two law systems, i.e., the formal trial and the informal case 
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disposition, started to work alongside each other.200 This 
development is easier to accept in common-law systems as judges 
are allowed and indeed asked to develop law. In civil-law 
countries, too, the development of customary law is 
acknowledged to some degree. Herrmann holds that criminal 
justice is a “living organism” and hence it is possible to develop it 
against the law.201 Also, Schünemann regards the increasing use 
of informal settlements in Germany as a form of development of 
customary law.202 However, the development of customary law 
finds its limits in the fundamental principle of law and the rule of 
law. And as was shown above, the legality of informal agreements 
was always highly contested.  
But there is a more fundamental problem with informal 
criminal procedures, i.e., the consequences of the duality of 
systems. When two systems exist side by side, the crucial question 
is, who has the power to decide which system is used in which 
case and which criteria are taken into account in this decision? 
The main argument of the proponents of plea bargaining in 
England and Wales and informal agreements in Germany is that 
the defendant has the choice between safeguards and sanction 
reduction. However, this argument has two crucial flaws: first, 
defendants often do not have the necessary information to make 
this rational decision. They lack insight into the practices and 
routines of the court, they have no access to the prosecutor’s 
files, and it is seldom possible for a lay person to evaluate the 
strength of the prosecutor’s evidence, especially in large-scale 
procedures. As a consequence, defendant will be dependent on 
the decisions made by the lawyers, who have their own interests 
in mind. Second, even if the defendants themselves have a 
choice, the divergence from a formal trial silences both the 
public (who are denied an audience at trial and whose interests 
are no longer represented by the prosecution, who again follow 
their own interests) and the victim. In both adversarial and 
inquisitorial criminal justice systems, it is the legal professionals 
who decide which cases are “worthy” of a full trial and which are 
to be disposed of informally. However, there are no guidelines 
on the criteria for this decision, and it seems that this is an area 
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of absolute, uncontrolled discretion.203 As was shown above, the 
criteria of selecting cases for plea negotiations are very random 
and more related to the characteristics of the defendant than the 
interest of the public. 
VII. SQUARING THE CIRCLE 
Informal agreements have spread so widely to all types of 
crime because the work pressure of under-resourced courts and 
prosecution offices have reprioritized the values of the criminal 
process. It is now the maxim of efficiency that often assumes first 
priority in decision making by legal professionals.204 Since 
negotiations among professionals have turned out to be much 
more efficient than contesting the case, traditional values of fair 
trial and proportionate sentencing have to make way for the new 
value of “process economy.”205 The new legislation claims to 
square the circle of plea bargaining, making it possible to profit 
from all the advantages of informal agreements while 
simultaneously upholding the main principles of the formal 
criminal trial. However, it is doubtful whether the new procedure 
can combine the benefits of informal agreements while 
preserving the safeguards of the formal procedure. First, the new 
legislation focuses on agreements between all parties during the 
trial whereas in reality many deals are struck before the main 
hearing and are often without the participation of the court. 
Thus a great number of negotiations fall outside the scope of the 
new legislation. Second, as the confession is not sufficient to 
establish the defendant’s guilt, the court is expected to study the 
dossier carefully and satisfy itself that there are no legal or factual 
obstacles to the agreed outcome.206 The extent to which the 
validity of the confession will be examined by the courts remains 
to be seen. As one of the main reasons for the development of 
informal agreements was the shortening of proceedings, it is 
open to question whether courtroom actors are now inclined to 
lengthen them. One could argue that a hearing that examines 
the validity of the admission of guilt is still shorter than a full 
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trial, but experience shows that courtroom actors often do not 
feel that they can afford the time to check the validity of the 
confession. Thus, with hindsight, it is not surprising that 
courtroom actors repeatedly disregarded the Federal High Court 
of Justice rulings and continued to extend the use of informal 
negotiations. Legislation that reiterates rules that have proven to 
be unacceptable to courtroom actors will hardly be able to 
change a well-established practice. 
Last, but by no means least, the question of appeal, which 
opens the practice to supervision of the higher courts, has not 
been addressed appropriately by the legislature. There is no 
disagreement that undue pressure, be it threats or inappropriate 
promises, are forbidden and render any agreement void. The 
essential question is how the authenticity of the confession can 
be tested. It is the informality of the negotiations, in which the 
courtroom actors can speak freely off the record without the risk 
of creating grounds for an appeal, that makes informal 
negotiations so attractive. The informality is the reason that the 
attempts by the Federal High Court of Justice to render 
negotiations and agreements more visible were opposed by 
practitioners, and waivers of appeals are made regularly part of 
settlements. It is doubtful whether this procedure can combine 
the benefits of informal agreements while preserving the 
safeguards of the formal procedure. 
It has been shown throughout this Article that informal 
agreements have been developed as a response to the growing 
gap between theoretical values of the formal process and the 
practical demands on courtroom actors. The development of an 
informal practice that has been developed outside the written law 
and outside the explicit rulings of both the Federal 
Constitutional Court and the Federal High Court of Justice 
proves how wide this gap is. On the one hand, substantive 
criminal law, which has been used to solve different social 
problems since the Penal Code was first written in the nineteenth 
century, has changed its function. On the other hand, the notion 
of criminal procedure and the role of punishment have shifted. 
Neither is reflected in the development of the formal criminal 
trial. The irreconcilability of traditional criminal procedure and 
modern criminal law seems to be an overlooked side effect of 
reforms in substantive criminal law. Considering how much 
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weight is given to the core values and how much pride is placed 
in the term “rule of law,” a departure from such values has to be 
consciously considered. Rather than leaving it to the courts to 
cope with the strains of new procedures, the legislature and civil 
society have to decide how to reconcile substantive and 
procedural criminal justice. The solution for this enormous task 
cannot be found in criminal law and criminal procedural law 
alone,207 but by taking a broader look on an inter-disciplinary 
basis—for example, by considering options such as the 
reformation of tax law and accounting law, a re-transfer of 
certain offenses to administrative law, and a reconsideration of 
the criminalization of certain risk-creating offenses. 
The rules that the Federal High Court developed and the 
legislature reiterated neither discussed these underlying tensions 
nor succeeded in formulating a procedure that would help 
courtroom actors serve the demands of both procedural and 
substantive criminal law. It seems that both the Federal High 
Court of Justice and the legislature assume the problems are 
solved as soon as they give the courtroom actors the extra 
freedom they are demanding. This approach demonstrates a lack 
of understanding of the underlying conflict between the 
different demands on the legal practitioners. Although 
regulation of previously informal negotiations in criminal law is 
welcome, the legislature unfortunately failed to debate the role 
of modern criminal law. 
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